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Abstract
The problem of cyber attacks with bounded sensor reading edits for partially-observed discrete event systems is considered.
An operator observes a plant through an observation mask that does not allow him to detect the occurrence of certain events
(silent events). The observation is corrupted by an attacker who can insert and erase some sensor readings. The operator
observes the system evolution in order to validate if a state in a given set of unsafe states is reached. The attacker corrupts the
observation with the aim of preventing the operator to verify when an interesting state has been reached. Furthermore, the
attacker wants to remain stealthy, namely he wants the operator does not realize that someone is corrupting his observation.
An automaton, called attack structure is proposed, which supports the attacker in defining an effective attack. In more detail,
first, the unbounded attack structure is obtained by doing the concurrent composition of two state observers, the attacker
observer and the operator observer. Then, the n-bounded attack structure, for a given integer value of n, is obtained by doing
the concurrent composition of the unbounded attack structure and an n-bounded attack automaton. Finally, the n-bounded
attack structure can be made supremal and stealthy by appropriately trimming the previous attack structure. A stealthy
attacker can elaborate his strategy looking at the supremal stealthy attack substructure and may result in different degrees
of effectiveness: strong, weak or vain. The proposed approach can be dually used to verify if such an attack could be effective
for the given system, thus to establish if the system is safe under attack.
Key words: Discrete event system; Cyber attack; Bounded sensor reading edit; Attacker.
1 Introduction
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) arise from the interaction of physical processes, computational resources and com-
munication capabilities. Examples of CPS include transportation systems, medical monitoring, power generation
and distribution systems, process control systems, advanced communication systems, etc. [1]. With the extensive
applications of CPS, there are higher risks for the systems to suffer attacks from malicious agents.
Recently, some works have considered the issue of network-based malicious attacks and detections [2], [3], [4] in
the context of continuous systems. There are some studies on malicious attacks and detections in the framework of
discrete event systems [5], [6], [7]. In [8] the focus is on fault diagnosis of discrete event systems under attack. In
particular, the problem of opacity enforcement by insertion functions under energy constraints has been investigated
in [9]. The problem of supervisory control of discrete event systems under attack has been considered in [10], [11].
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Mainly inspired by some recent works [12], [13], [14], [15], we address the problem of cyber attacks with bounded
sensor reading edits for partially-observed discrete event systems. In [12], the authors present a new finite structure
called parallel observer, which allows to simultaneously describe the observations of the supervisor and of the
attacker. Based on the parallel observer, a maximally permissive supervisor is developed to enforce current-state
opacity. Recently, the authors of [13] propose a novel bipartite transition structure in the framework of discrete event
systems, namely, Insertion-Deletion Attack Structure, and present a game-like relationship between the supervisor
and the environment (the plant and the attacker). The attacker can lead the plant to the unsafe critical states
without being detected by the supervisor.
In [14], the authors propose a defense policy that prevents cyber attacks at sensor and actuator layer in supervisory
control systems. It is assumed that the attacker can alter the observation of events in a set of events Σvs, and modify
the enabling of events in a set of events Σva. The detectable network attack security and undetectable network attack
security are introduced to prevent the plant from reaching the unsafe states. We finally recall that in [15] the author
proposes the problem of attack-with-bounded-sensor-reading-alteration (ABSRA), where the attacker can intercept
the sensor readings from the plant and arbitrarily alter them but with an upper bound on the length of the altered
observation string. In this way the attacker can cheat the supervisor, which will lead the plant to the undesirable
states. The author also develops a supervisor that is robust to ABSRA.
In this paper that is a journal version of [16] 1 , we consider a plant modeled as a discrete event system, whose
evolution is observed by an operator. The occurrence of a subset of events, called observable events, can be detected
by sensors while all other events, called silent events, produce no observation. We assume that sensor readings may
be corrupted by an attacker. This could happen because either the attacker can gain direct control of a sensor or it
can corrupt messages between the plant and the operator (assuming they are connected through a network).
The operator observes the system evolution in order to verify if a state in a given set of unsafe states is reached.
The attacker corrupts the observation with the aim of preventing the operator to establish when an unsafe state
is reached. The attacker is required to be stealthy, i.e., the operator should not be able to detect that the plant is
under attack. In addition, we fix an upper bound on the number of consecutive observations that can be added by
the attacker within the occurrence of two observable events in the plant.
We model the plant as a partially observed automaton and assume that a set of observable events can be compromised
by an attacker. In particular, the attacker may insert in the string observed by the operator fake occurrences of
compromised events or, on the contrary, may erase the occurrence of compromised events. In this paper, we show
how to design a supremal stealthy attack substructure, which allows the attacker to compute (if it exists) a policy that
prevents the operator to realize when an unsafe state is reached, without revealing his presence. The attack structure
simultaneously keep into account the set of states consistent with the real observation produced by the plant and the
set of states consistent with the corrupted observation. It allows the attacker to elaborate an attack strategy that
allows him, if possible, to reach his goal without being discovered thanks to stealthyness. Finally, the supremalness
of the attack structure guarantees the maximally permissive behaviour in terms of corrupted observations, given the
constraints in the number of events that can be consecutively inserted, and the fact that the attacker should remain
stealthy.
We notice that, the proposed approach allows, dually, to evaluate the robustness of the system observation with
respect to attacks in the considered setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some background on finite-state automata
and recall the fundamental notion of observer. In Section 3, the attack model considered in the paper is presented.
In Section 4, the problem statement is given. In Section 5, we develop two observers: attacker observer and operator
observer. In Section 6, we define the unbounded attack structure as the concurrent composition of such observers.
Then, we define an automaton that allows us, again via concurrent composition, to define a bounded attack structure,
starting from the unbounded one. In Section 7, a way to refine such structures in order to find a supremal stealthy
attack substructure is detailed. The notion of stealthy attack function associated with a given supremal stealthy
attack substructure, is introduced in Section 8. The supremal stealthy attack substructure defines all the possible
stealthy attacks that can be obtained in the considered setting. A characterization of the situations in which it is
possible to select a strong or a weak attacker starting from the previous attack structure is discussed in Section 9.
Conclusions are finally drawn in Section 10 where we also discuss our future lines of research in this framework.
1 In [16] we only provided preliminary ideas by considering a less general problem statement, without involving the bound
on the number of inserted events. Furthermore, no algorithm is formalized.
2
2 Preliminaries
A deterministic finite-state automaton (DFA) is a four-tuple G = (X,E, δ, x0), where X is the set of states, E is the
set of events (alphabet), δ : X×E → X is the transition function, and x0 is the initial state. The transition function
can be extended to δ∗ : X × E∗ → X such that δ∗(x, ε) = x, and δ∗(x, σe) = δ(δ∗(x, σ), e) for all x ∈ X, e ∈ E and
σ ∈ E∗. The generated language of G is defined as L(G) = {σ ∈ E∗|δ∗(x0, σ) is defined}. Given two alphabets E′
and E with E′ ⊆ E, the natural projection on E′, PE′ : E∗ → E′ is defined as [17]:
PE′(ε) := ε , PE′(σe) :=
{
PE′(σ)e if e ∈ E′,
PE′(σ) if e ∈ E \ E′.
(1)
Therefore, given a word σ ∈ E∗, its natural projection on E′ is obtained by erasing events that do not belong to E′.
The concurrent composition of two languages is defined as L1‖L2 = {σ ∈ E∗ | PE1(σ) ∈ L1, PE2(σ) ∈ L2}, where
E1 and E2 are alphabets of L1 and L2, respectively, and E = E1 ∪ E2.
The concurrent composition operator is also applicable to DFA. In particular, given two DFA G′ and G′′, their
concurrent composition, denoted as G = G′||G′′, generates language L(G) = L(G′)||L(G′′).
A partially-observed deterministic finite-state automaton is denoted as G = (X,E, δ, x0), where E = Eo ∪Euo, Eo is
the set of observable events, and Euo is the set of unobservable events. In the following, to keep the notation simple,
we denote as P : E∗ → E∗o the natural projection on Eo.
The unobservable reach of a state x ∈ X, denoted by UR(x), is defined as a set of states x′ ∈ X reached from state
x by executing an unobservable string σ ∈ E∗uo, i.e., UR(x) = {x′ | ∃σ ∈ E∗uo, δ∗(x, σ) = x′}. The definition can be
extended to a set of states B ⊆ 2X as follows: UR(B) = ⋃
x∈B
UR(x).
The observer Obs(G) of a partially-observed plant G is a DFA [18]: Obs(G) = (B,Eo, δobs, b0), where B ⊆ 2X is
the set of states, Eo is the set of events, δobs : B × Eo → B is the transition function defined as: δobs(b, eo) :=⋃
x∈b
UR({x′ | δ(x, eo) = x′}), and b0 := UR(x0) is the initial state.
The classical model of a plant observed by an operator is shown in Fig. 1, where σ is a string generated by the plant
G. An operator observes the plant through an observation mask P , where P is the projection of σ over E0. The
string observed by the operator is s = P (σ).
Fig. 1. Plant observed by an operator.
Example 1 Consider a partially-observed plant G = (X,E, δ, x0) in Fig. 2(a), where E = Eo∪Euo, Eo = {a, c, d, g},
and Euo = {b}. The corresponding observer of G is shown in Fig. 2(b). 2
(a) G (b) Obs(G)
Fig. 2. (a) A partially-observed plant G; (b) its observer Obs(G), where Eo = {a, c, d, g}.
3
3 Attack model
In this paper we consider a plant modeled by a partially observable DFA with set of observable events Eo and set of
unobservable events Euo. Referring to Fig. 3, if σ is a string generated by the plant, the observed string is s = P (σ).
An attacker may corrupt the output signals produced by the plant with the effect of inserting in the observation
some events that did not occur, or erasing some events that have occurred. Such a corrupted observation is denoted
as s′ (a sequence of events in Eo), and the plant operator constructs its state estimation based on s′.
Fig. 3. A plant G under attack.
Definition 2 [13] The set of compromised events is denoted as Ecom ⊆ Eo. It includes all the observable events that
can be corrupted by the attacker, either inserting them in the operator observation, even if they have not actually
occurred, or erasing them in the operator observation. 2
The definition of compromised events was first proposed in [13]. However, while in [13] the authors assume that
all the compromised events can be inserted and erased by the attacker, here we slightly generalize the definition as
follows.
The set of compromised events that can be inserted in the observer evolution is denoted as Eins, and the set of
events that can be erased is denoted as Eera. To keep the presentation general, we assume that Eins and Eera are
not necessarily disjoint.
The relationship among the different subsets of observable events Eo is clarified in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. The relationship among the subsets of Eo.
We now formally describe the action of the attacker in terms of two new types of events that it can generate. More
precisely, even if it is possible to directly define the attacker as a finite-state transducer that “translates” an observed
string s into a corrupted observation s′ (see Fig. 3), for a reason that will appear clear in the following, we prefer to
characterize the attacker’s action in terms of a new string defined on a so-called attack alphabet Ea.
Definition 3 The attack alphabet is defined as Ea = Eo∪E+∪E−, and we assume that Eo, E+, and E− are disjoint
sets.
The set of inserted events is denoted as E+, namely E+ = {e+ | e ∈ Eins}. The occurrence of an event e+ ∈ E+
denotes the fact that the attacker inserts in the operator observation an event e ∈ Eins that has not occurred in
reality.
The set of erased events is denoted as E−, namely E− = {e− | e ∈ Eera}. The occurrence of an event e− ∈ E−
denotes the fact that the attacker erases from the operator’s observation event e ∈ Eera generated by plant. 2
Given a bound n ∈ N ∪ {∞}, we define E≤n+ = {w+ ∈ E∗+ | |w+| ≤ n} the set of strings on alphabet E+ whose
length does not exceed n. Note that if n =∞ then E≤n+ = E∗+.
Definition 4 Given a plant G with a set of compromised events Ecom = Eins ∪Eera, let n ∈ N∪ {∞} be a bound.
An n-bounded attacker can be defined by an attack function fn : P (L(G)) → E∗a , where Ea is the attack alphabet
(Definition 3), satisfying the following conditions:
4
(a) fn(ε) ∈ E≤n+ ,
(b) ∀se ∈ P (L(G)) with s ∈ E∗o : {
fn(se) ∈ fn(s){e−, e}E≤n+ if e ∈ Eera,
fn(se) ∈ fn(s)eE≤n+ if e ∈ Eo \ Eera,
(2)
where eE≤n+ = {ew+ | w+ ∈ E≤n+ } and e−E≤n+ = {e−w+ | w+ ∈ E≤n+ }.
2
In Definition 4, condition (a) means that the attacker can insert a bounded string w+ ∈ E≤n+ even if no event occurs
in the plant. Condition (b) implies that if an event e ∈ Eera occurs, the attacker can either erase event e or not
erase it, and then insert a bounded string w+ ∈ E≤n+ . If an event e ∈ Eo\Eera occurs, then the attacker can insert
a bounded string w+ ∈ E≤n+ after e.
We denote as Fn the set of attack functions for a given n ∈ N ∪ {∞}.
Definition 5 The language modified by an attack function fn is called attack language. It is denoted as L(fn, G)
and is defined as L(fn, G) = fn(P (L(G))). A string w ∈ L(fn, G) is called an attack string.
The set of all the attack languages relative to a given n ∈ N ∪ {∞}, denoted as L(Fn, G), is defined as
L(Fn, G) =
⋃
fn∈Fn
L(fn, G) =
⋃
fn∈Fn
fn(P (L(G))). (3)
2
Given two integer numbers n and n′, Fn ⊆ Fn′ if n ≤ n′. Furthermore, Fn ⊆ F∞ for all n <∞.
Definition 6 The reduction projection Pˆ : E∗a → E∗o is defined as:
Pˆ (ε) := ε, Pˆ (wea) :=
{
Pˆ (w)e if ea∈Ea \ E−,
Pˆ (w) if ea∈E−.
(4)
2
The internal structure of the attacker is visualized in Fig. 3 as a black box taking an observation s as an input and
producing a corrupted observation s′ as an output. Such an internal structure is sketched in more detail in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. Internal structure of the attacker with observed string s ∈ E∗o , attack string w ∈ E∗a , and corrupted observation
s′ ∈ E∗o .
Here the observed string is s = P (σ) (a sequence of events in Eo). The attacker corrupts the observation according
to the attack function fn, producing w ∈ L(fn, G) ⊆ E∗a . Such a sequence is projected via Pˆ on Eo, generating a
string s′. The plant operator constructs its state estimation based on s′.
4 Problem statement
We first introduce some key definitions that will be useful in the following to formalize the problem statement.
5
Definition 7 Consider a plant G with set of observable events Eo and set of compromised events Ecom. An attacker
with an attack function fn is said to be stealthy if Pˆ (L(fn, G)) ⊆ P (L(G)). 2
In words, an attacker is stealthy if the set of words that an operator may observe when the system is under attack
is contained in the set of words the operator may observe when no attack occurs. This guarantees that the operator
does not realize that the plant is under attack.
We now assume that a set of unsafe states Xus is given, which corresponds to an undesirable or dangerous condition
for the plant G. The operator observes the plant with the objective of establishing if the plant is in an unsafe state
or not, in order to eventually activate some appropriate action. The following definition provides a characterization
of the attacker, depending on three different cases that may occur.
Definition 8 Let G = (X,E, δ, x0) be a plant with set of observable events Eo and Obs(G) = (B,Eo, δobs, bo) be
its observer. Let Ecom be the set of compromised events. Given a set of unsafe states Xus ⊆ X, an attacker with an
attack function fn is said to be:
• strong if there exists a string s ∈ P (L(G)) : δ∗obs(xo, s) ⊆ Xus and δ∗obs(bo, s′) ∩Xus = ∅, where s′ = Pˆ (fn(s));• weak if there exists a string s ∈ P (L(G)) : δ∗obs(xo, s) ∩ Xus 6= ∅, δ∗obs(xo, s) * Xus, and δ∗obs(bo, s′) ∩ Xus = ∅,
where s′ = Pˆ (fn(s));
• vain if it is neither weak nor strong.
An attacker that is either strong or weak is said to be effective. 2
According to the above definition, an attacker is strong if there exists at least one uncorrupted observation s whose
set of consistent states is included in the set of unsafe states, while the set of states consistent with the corrupted
observation s′ does not contain unsafe states. This implies that if a system evolves producing the uncorrupted
observation s, then it reaches an unsafe state without the operator realizing it.
An attacker is weak if there exists at least one uncorrupted observation s whose set of consistent states contains some
unsafe state but it is not included in the set of unsafe states, while the set of states consistent with the corrupted
observation s′ does not contain unsafe states. This means that if a system evolves producing the uncorrupted
observation s, then it may have reached an unsafe state without the operator realizing it.
Finally, if neither of the two cases occurs, the attacker is said to be vain.
Example 9 Consider the plant G and its observer Obs(G) in Fig. 2 already discussed in Example 2. Let Xus = {5}
and Eins = {c}.
Assume that the uncorrupted observation is s = aba. In such a case the plant is in state {5}. If the attacker inserts
event c, the corrupted observation is s′ = abac and the operator thinks that the plant is in state {6}. In this case,
the attacker is strong.
Let us now consider the plant G′ and its observer Obs(G′) in Fig. 6. Let E = Eo ∪Euo, where Eo = {a, c, d, g}, and
Euo = {b}. Let Xus = {5} and Eins = {c}.
(a) G′ (b) Obs(G′)
Fig. 6. (a) A partially-observed plant G′ and (b) its observer Obs(G′), where Eo = {a, c, d, g}.
Assume that the uncorrupted observation is s = aa. The set of states consistent with the observation s is equal to
{4, 5}, thus it contains the unsafe state but it is not included in Xus. If the attacker inserts event c, the corrupted
6
observation is s′ = aac and the operator thinks that the plant is in state {6}, thus the attacker is weak: if the real
state is {4} the attacker is not successful; if the real state is {5}, it is successful. 2
The goal of this paper is to provide a systematic approach to compute an attack function fn that defines a stealthy
strong or a stealthy weak attacker. If a solution to such a problem exists, it means that the system is not robust to
attacks in the considered setting. On the contrary, if a solution does not exist, safeness under attack is ensured.
5 Attacker Observer and Operator Observer
In this section we introduce two special structures, called Attacker Observer and Operator Observer, which are
fundamental to derive the proposed solution to the above problem.
5.1 Attacker Observer
The attacker observer Obsatt(G) describes all possible attack strings that can be generated by functions in F∞ and
the corresponding sets of consistent states of the system. Since attacks are performed by the attacker, he knows
which observations originate from events that have really occurred on the plant (Eo), which observations have been
erased (E−), and which observations have been inserted (E+). The attacker observer Obsatt(G) can be constructed
using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Construction of the attacker observer Obsatt(G)
Input: An observer Obs(G) = (B,Eo, δobs, b0), Eins, and Eera.
Output: An attacker observer Obsatt(G) = (B,Ea, δatt, b0).
1: Let Ea := Eo ∪ E+ ∪ E−;
2: Let δatt := δobs;
3: for all e ∈ Eera, do
4: for all b ∈ B, do
5: if δatt(b, e) = b
′, then
6: δatt(b, e−) = b′;
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: for all e ∈ Eins, do
11: for all b ∈ B, do
12: δatt(b, e+) = b;
13: end for
14: end for
According to Algorithm 1, the set Ea is initially computed and the transition function of Obsatt(G) is initialized at
δatt = δobs. Indeed, events in Eo are events actually occurring on the plant, thus when such events occur the attacker
updates his state estimation according to the transition function of Obs(G).
Then, for all e ∈ Eera and for all b ∈ B, whenever δatt(b, e) is defined, the algorithm imposes δatt(b, e−) = δatt(b, e).
Indeed, the attacker knows that e− corresponds to event e that has been canceled, thus the way he updates his
estimation is the same in the case of e and e−.
Finally, for all events e ∈ Eins, and for all states b ∈ B, we add self-loops δatt(b, e+) = b. Indeed, the attacker knows
that events in E+ are fake events that have not really occurred on the plant, thus he does not update his estimation
based on them. In particular, self-loops correspond to the possibility of inserting an arbitrarily large number of such
events, which is consistent with the fact that we are dealing with attack functions in F∞.
Example 10 Consider again the plant G in Example 2. Let Eins = {c, d}, and Eera = {c, g}. The attacker observer
constructed using Algorithm 1 is shown in Fig. 7(a).
Since events c, g ∈ Eera, and there is a transition labeled c from state {1, 2} to state {3} in the observer of the
plant Obs(G), we add transitions labeled c and c− from state {1, 2} to state {3} in the attacker observer. Similar
7
(a) Obsatt(G) (b) Obsopr(G)
Fig. 7. (a) Attacker observer and (b) operator observer.
arguments can be used to explain transitions labeled c and c− from state {5} to state {6}, self-loops labeled g and
g− at state {4}. Then, since c, d ∈ Eins, we add self-loops labeled c+ and d+ at all the states. 2
The following proposition provides a characterization of the language generated by Obsatt(G).
Proposition 11 Let G be a plant with set of observable events Eo, observer Obs(G) = (B,Eo, δobs, b0), and sets of
events Eins and Eera. Let Obsatt(G) be the attacker observer constructed using Algorithm 1. It holds that:
(a) L(Obsatt(G)) = L(F∞, G);
(b) ∀s ∈ P (L(G)), ∀w ∈ ⋃
f∞∈F∞
f∞(s), δ∗att(b0, w) = δ
∗
obs(b0, s).
Proof. (a) Follows from the construction rules implemented in Algorithm 1. Indeed, Step 2 implies that L(Obsatt(G))
contains all words that can be observed if no attack occurs. Steps 3–9 guarantee that all attacks resulting from the
cancellation of events in Eera are considered. Finally, Steps 10–14 guarantee that all attacks resulting from the
insertion of an arbitrarily large number of events in Eins are taken into account.
(b) We prove this by induction on the length of s. If s = ε, the result follows from the fact that, by definition of
attack function, it is f∞(ε) ∈ E≤n+ , and by Steps 10–14, events in E+ lead to self-loops in Obsatt(G).
Let us now consider a generic word s ∈ P (L(G)) with length greater than one, written as s = se, where s ∈ P (L(G))
and e ∈ Eo. Assume the result holds for s. We prove that it also holds for s = se considering the following two
possible cases.
If e ∈ Eera, by the definition of attack function, w ∈
⋃
f∞∈F∞
f∞(s){e−, e}E≤n+ is true. According to Steps 3–9, events
e and e− are dealt with in the same manner when defining the transition function δatt. Finally, as just pointed out,
according to Steps 10–14, events in E+ lead to self-loops in Obsatt(G).
Finally, if e ∈ Eo \Eera, by the definition of attack function, w ∈
⋃
f∞∈F∞
f∞(s)eE
≤n
+ is true. Thus the result follows
from the fact that, according to Steps 10–14, events in E+ lead to self-loops in Obsatt(G) and events in Eo are dealt
with in the same manner in Obsatt(G) and Obs(G). 2
5.2 Operator Observer
The operator observer Obsopr(G) generates two different sets of words. The first set includes all words on E
∗
a that
may either result from an uncorrupted observation of the plant or from a corrupted observation which keeps the
8
attacker stealthy. The second set of words includes all the previous words continued with a symbol in Ea so that
the resulting word is not consistent with an uncorrupted observation. While the words in the first set lead to a set
of states that according to the operator are consistent with the perceived observation, those in the second set lead
to a dummy state denoted as b∅. The operator observer Obsopr(G) can be constructed using Algorithm 2, as shown
below.
Algorithm 2 Construction of the operator observer Obsopr(G)
Input: An observer Obs(G) = (B,Eo, δobs, b0), Eins, and Eera.
Output: An operator observer Obsopr(G) = (Bopr, Ea, δopr, b0).
1: Let Bopr := B ∪ b∅;
2: Let Ea := Eo ∪ E+ ∪ E−;
3: Let δopr := δobs;
4: for all e ∈ Eins, do
5: for all b ∈ B, do
6: if δopr(b, e) = b
′, then
7: δopr(b, e+) = b
′;
8: end if
9: end for
10: end for
11: for all e ∈ Eera, do
12: for all b ∈ B, do
13: δopr(b, e−) = b;
14: end for
15: end for
16: for all ea ∈ Ea, do
17: for all b ∈ B, do
18: if δopr(b, ea) is not defined, then
19: δopr(b, ea) = b∅;
20: end if
21: end for
22: end for
According to Algorithm 2, the set of states Bopr = B ∪ {b∅} and the set of events Ea are initially computed. Then,
the transition function of Obsopr(G) is initialized at δopr = δobs. Indeed, events in Eo are events actually occurring
on the plant; when such events occur, the operator updates his state estimation according to the transition function
of Obs(G).
Furthermore, for all e ∈ Eins and for all b ∈ B, we impose δopr(b, e+) = δopr(b, e). Indeed, the operator does not
distinguish between events in E+ and the corresponding events in Eins. For all e ∈ Eera and for all b ∈ B, we add
self-loops δopr(b, e−) = b. Indeed, events in E− correspond to no observation by the operator.
Finally, for all the events ea ∈ Ea that are not enabled at the generic state b ∈ B, let δopr(b, ea) = b∅. As a result, for
all b ∈ B and for all ea ∈ Ea, function δopr(b, ea) is defined. On the contrary, δopr(b∅, ea) is undefined for all ea ∈ Ea.
In the following, the set of stealthy words on the attack alphabet Ea is defined as:
Ws = {w ∈ E∗a | Pˆ (w) ∈ P (L(G))}. (5)
It represents the set of words on Ea that are consistent with observations of the plant without attack. Therefore,
the observation of such words do not reveal the presence of the attacker.
Example 12 Consider again the plant G in Example 2. Let Eins = {c, d} and Eera = {c, g}. The operator observer
constructed using Algorithm 2 is visualized in Fig. 7(b).
Since c, d ∈ Eins and there is a transition labeled c from state {1, 2} to state {3} in Obs(G), we add transitions
labeled c and c+ from state {1, 2} to state {3} in the operator observer. Similar arguments can be used to explain
the transitions labeled c and c+ from state {5} to state {6}, and the self-loops labeled d and d+ at state {7}. Then,
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since c, g ∈ Eera, we add self-loops labeled c− and g− at all the states. Finally, we add all the missing transitions to
the new state b∅, which has no output arc. 2
The following proposition provides a characterization of the language generated by Obsopr(G).
Proposition 13 Let G be a plant with set of observable events Eo, observer Obs(G) = (B,Eo, δobs, b0), and sets of
events Eins and Eera. Let Obsopr(G) be the operator observer constructed by Algorithm 2. It holds that:
(a) L(Obsopr(G)) = Ws ∪WsEa, where WsEa = {wea | w ∈Ws, ea ∈ Ea};
(b) ∀w ∈ L(Obsopr(G)): if w ∈Ws, then δ∗opr(b0, w) = δ∗obs(b0, Pˆ (w)); else δ∗opr(b0, w) = b∅.
Proof. (a) Follows from Algorithm 2, and from the definitions of stealthy words and reduction projection. In
more detail, Step 3 guarantees that all uncorrupted words belong to L(Obsopr(G)). Steps 4–10 guarantee that, in
Obsopr(G), events in E+ lead to the same states of the corresponding events in Eins. Steps 11–15 guarantee that, in
Obsopr(G), events in E− lead to self-loops. Finally, Steps 16–22 impose that, if after executing Steps 1–15, a certain
event in Ea is not already enabled at a certain state of Obsopr(G), then such an event is enabled at such a state and
leads to state b∅, where no other event may be executed.
(b) We prove this by induction on the length of w. If w = ε, the result holds being Pˆ (w) = ε.
Consider now a word w ∈ L(Obsopr(G)) with length greater than one. Assume w ∈ Ws, and let w = w′ea. Assume
that the result holds for a generic w′ ∈ Ws. By definition of reduction projection, it holds that Pˆ (w) = Pˆ (w′){e, ε}
being Pˆ (ea) = e if ea ∈ Eo ∪ E+, and Pˆ (ea) = ε if ea ∈ E−. Thus δ∗opr(b0, w) = δopr(δ∗opr(b0, w′), ea). Then,
δ∗obs(b0, Pˆ (w)) = δobs(δ
∗
obs(b0, Pˆ (w
′)), e) if ea ∈ Eo ∪ E+, and δ∗obs(b0, Pˆ (w)) = δobs(δ∗obs(b0, Pˆ (w′)), ε) if ea ∈ E−.
According to Algorithm 2 the transition function of Obsopr(G) starting for a generic state b ∈ B is defined in the
same way in case of e and e+ (Steps 6 and 7), while it corresponds to a self-loop in the case of e− ∈ E− (Step 13).
As a result, we can conclude that δ∗opr(b0, w) = δ
∗
obs(b0, Pˆ (w)).
Finally, the last claim in (b) follows from the fact that, if w /∈ Ws, according to Algorithm 2, all the missing
transitions end up in the new state b∅, thus δ∗opr(b0, w) = b∅. 2
6 Unbounded and n-bounded attack structures
In this section we define a particular DFA, called attack structure, which enables the attacker to select an effective
attack function. In particular, as detailed in the following, an attack structure is defined on alphabet Ea and contains
all the strings that can be generated by the plant, plus all the possible attack strings. The attacker, looking at the
attack structure and following the evolution of the plant, establishes which actions he can perform to corrupt the
operator observation.
Here we distinguish two different cases. In the first case, the attack function belongs to F∞. We call unbounded
attack structure the corresponding DFA, denoted as A∞. In the second case, the attack function belongs to Fn for
a given n ∈ N. We call n-bounded attack structure the corresponding DFA and denote it as An.
6.1 Unbounded attack structure
Let us first formalize the definition of A∞.
Definition 14 The unbounded attack structure A∞ = (R,Ea, δa, r0) w.r.t. G and Ecom is defined as A∞ =
Obsatt(G)||Obsopr(G). 2
Example 15 Consider again the plantG in Example 10 whose attacker observer and operator observer are visualized
in Figs. 7(a) and (b), respectively. The unbounded attack structure A∞ built according to Definition 14 is shown in
Fig. 8 (neglect for the moment the different colours associated with states).
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Fig. 8. Unbounded attack structure A∞.
By inspecting the unbounded attack structure A∞ in Fig. 8, once event a occurs on the plant, the attacker executes
event a on A∞ starting from the initial state ({0}, {0}). Thus state ({1, 2}, {1, 2}) is reached. Now, the attacker may
wait for a new event occurring on the plant, a or c in this case. Alternatively, the attacker may insert an event c or
d in the operator observation, which correspond to execute c+ or d+, respectively, in A∞. Finally, the attacker may
erase event c in the operator observation, which corresponds to execute c− in A∞. 2
Theorem 16 Let G be a plant with attack alphabet Ea and set of stealthy words Ws. Let A∞ = (R,Ea, δa, r0) be
its unbounded attack structure. It holds that:
(a) L(A∞) = (L(F∞, G) ∩Ws) ∪ (L(F∞, G) ∩WsEa);
(b) ∀s ∈ P (L(G)), ∀w = f∞(s) with f∞ ∈ F∞, δ∗a(r0, w) = r, where r0 = (b0, b0) and r = (ba, ba) iff δ∗obs(b0, s) = ba,
δ∗obs(b0, Pˆ (w)) = ba.
Proof. (a) Follows from Propositions 11 and 13 and Definition 14. Indeed, by Proposition 11, it holds that
L(Obsatt(G)) = L(F∞, G) and by Proposition 13, it holds that L(Obsopr(G)) = Ws ∪WsEa. Since A∞ is defined as
the concurrent composition of two DFA, Obsatt(G) and Obsopr(G), having the same alphabet, its language is equal to
the intersection of the languages of the two DFA. As a result, it is L(A∞) = (L(F∞, G)∩Ws)∪ (L(F∞, G)∩WsEa).
(b) (If) Assume that δ∗obs(b0, s) = ba, δ
∗
obs(b0, Pˆ (w)) = ba. By Propositions 11 and 13, it holds that δ
∗
obs(b0, s) =
δ∗att(b0, w) and δ
∗
obs(b0, Pˆ (w)) = δ
∗
opr(b0, w), namely, δ
∗
att(b0, w) = ba and δ
∗
opr(b0, w) = ba. Since A∞ = Obsatt(G)‖
Obsopr(G), by definition of concurrent composition, it is δ
∗
a(r0, w) = r.
(Only if) Assume that δ∗a(r0, w) = r. Since A∞ = Obsatt(G)‖Obsopr(G), by definition of concurrent composition,
it holds that δ∗att(b0, w) = ba and δ
∗
opr(b0, w) = ba. By Propositions 11 and 13, it is δ
∗
obs(b0, s) = δ
∗
att(b0, w) and
δ∗obs(b0, Pˆ (w)) = δ
∗
opr(b0, w), namely, δ
∗
obs(b0, s) = ba and δ
∗
obs(b0, Pˆ (w)) = ba. 2
In summary, Theorem 16 implies that, using the attack structure A∞ as explained above, all possible attack functions
in F∞ may be implemented.
6.2 n-bounded attack structure
The n-bounded attack structure An that allows to select all possible attack functions in Fn, can be easily obtained
starting from A∞. To this aim, a particular DFA, called n-bounded attack automaton, denoted as Gn, is introduced.
Then An is obtained as the concurrent composition of A∞ and Gn.
Definition 17 The n-bounded attack automaton is a DFA: Gn = (X,Ea, δ, 0), where X = {0, 1, . . . , n} (n ∈ N),
and the transition function is defined as follows:
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{
∀i ∈ X, δ(i, ea) := 0 if ea ∈ Ea \ E+,
∀X\{n}, δ(i, ea) := i+ 1 if ea ∈ E+.
(6)
2
Fig. 9 shows the n-bounded attack automaton Gn. As it can be seen, events in Ea \E+ are enabled at any state. On
the contrary, events in E+ are enabled provided that they have not been already executed n times consecutively.
Fig. 9. n-bounded attack automaton Gn
Theorem 18 Let G be a plant with attack alphabet Ea and unbounded attack structure A∞ = (R,Ea, δa, r0). Let
An = A∞||Gn, whereGn is the n-bounded attack automaton. It holds that L(An) = L(A∞)\{w ∈ L(A∞) | consE+(w)
> n}, where consE+(w) denotes the number of consecutive events in E+ contained in the word w.
Proof. Follows from the fact that An is defined as An = A∞||Gn and Gn limits to n the maximum number of
consecutive events that the attacker can add to the operator observation. 2
7 Supremal stealthy attack substructure
In this section we show how an attack structure A (which may either be an unbounded or an n-bounded attack
structure) should be appropriately trimmed to ensure that all the actions that an attacker may implement (erase or
insert events) based on it, guarantee stealthyness. We call stealthy attack substructure the DFA resulting from the
trimming operation and show that it is also “supremal”, namely it generates all the possible corrupted observations
that guarantee stealthyness.
Let us first introduce the notion of exposing and stealthy states of an attack structure.
Definition 19 Given an attack structure A = (R,Ea, δa, r0) we define the set of exposing states as Re := {r =
(ba, ba) ∈ R | ba = b∅} and the set of stealthy states as Rs = R \Re. 2
An observation leading to an exposing state reveals the presence of an attacker to an operator observing the system’s
evolution. Note, however, that there may exist stealthy states from which an exposing state is necessarily reached
following a particular evolution of the plant.
Example 20 Consider the unbounded attack structure A∞ in Fig. 8 already considered in Example 15. When the
stealthy state ({6}, {4}) is reached, the plant is in state {6}. At this point, event a ∈ Eo \ Eera may occur in the
plant. Since the attacker can not erase event a, then the exposing state ({7}, {b∅}) is reached. The attacker may try
to pre-empt the occurrence of event a inserting an event in E+ = {c+, d+}. However, from ({6}, {4}) inserting any
of these events also yields exposing state ({6}, {b∅}). 2
To formalize this notion, let us consider the function f : 2Rs → 2Rs defined for all R′ ⊆ Rs as follows:
f(R′) = {r ∈ R′ | if
(a) (∃e ∈ Eo) δa(r, e) 6∈ R′
then either
(b) e ∈ Eera and δa(r, e−) ∈ R′
or
(c) (∃e′ ∈ Eins) δa(r, e′+) ∈ R′
}
.
(7)
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In words, the set f(R′) ⊆ R′ is the set of states from which a suitable attacker decision can prevent leaving R′. In
fact whenever the occurrence of an observable event e yields a new state not in R′ (condition (a)) it is possible to
remain in R′ either by erasing this event (condition (b)) or by preempting its firing by inserting an event e′+ for
some e′ ∈ Eins (condition (c)).
A fixed-point of f is a set Rfix ⊆ Rs such that f(Rfix) = Rfix. A suitable way to trim A to ensure stealthyness is
that of computing a fix point Rfix ⊆ Rs and removing from A all states not in Rfix: in such a case all states are
stealthy and there exists a suitable action that allows the attacker to remain within this set.
We point out that function f is monotone, i.e., by definition for all R′ ⊆ R′′ it holds that f(R′) ⊆ f(R′′). Thus
according to Tarski’s fixed-point theorem [19] there exists a maximal fixed-point of f that we denote R∗ and can be
computed as
R∗ =
⋂
k≥0
fk(Rs) (8)
in at most |Rs| iterations [20].
In addition, one can easily verify that, for all attack structures A, the set of states reachable without any attack
R0 = {(ba, ba) ∈ R | ba = ba} ⊆ Rs
is a fixed-point of f since the occurrence of an event e ∈ Eo does not lead out of this set: this ensures that R∗ ⊇ R0
is not empty.
Trimming an attack structure A removing all states in R \R∗ and all their input and output arcs will determine its
supremal stealthy attack substructure.
Definition 21 Given an attack structure A = (R,Ea, δa, r0) let R
∗ be the maximal fixed-point of function f . The
supremal stealthy attack substructure of A is Ass = (R∗, Ea, δ∗a, r0) where δ
∗
a = δa ∩ (R∗×Ea×R∗) is the restriction
of δa to R
∗. 2
In the following, set R∗ is called strongly stealthy region, and set Re = R \R∗ is called weakly exposing region.
The weakly exposing region Re of an attack structure A can be computed using Algorithm 3 whose main steps can
be explained as follows. First, we compute the set of exposing states Re. The weakly exposing region Re is initialized
at Re, as well as set Rnew that is introduced to define a stop criterion on the algorithm. While set Rnew is not
empty, Steps 5–12 are executed. In Step 5, Rnew is set equal to the empty set. Then (Step 6), states in R \ Re are
considered. Let us call r the generic state in R \Re. If
– either there exists (Step 7) at least one transition labeled e ∈ Eo \ Eera that yields from r to a state in Re, and
there does not exist a transition labeled e+ yielding to a state not in Re,
– or if for all the transitions e ∈ Eera that lead to Re and such that e− also leads to Re, and there does not exist a
transition e+ ∈ E+ that yields outside Re,
then, we add state r to Rnew (Step 8) and to Re (Step 9).
Algorithm 3 runs until no new state can be added to Re (namely, it is Rnew = ∅).
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Algorithm 3 Computation of the weakly exposing region Re
Input: An attack structure A = (R,Ea, δa, r0).
Output: The weakly exposing region Re.
1: Let Re := {r = (ba × ba) ∈ R | ba = b∅};
2: Let Rnew := Re;
3: Let Re := Re;
4: while Rnew 6= ∅, do
5: Let Rnew := ∅;
6: for all r ∈ R \Re, do
7: if (∃e ∈ Eo \ Eera : δa(r, e) ∈ Re, @e+ ∈ E+ : δa(r, e+) /∈ Re) ∨ (∀e ∈ Eera : δa(r, e) ∈ Re, δa(r, e−) ∈ Re,
@e+ ∈ E+ : δa(r, e+) /∈ Re), then
8: Rnew := Rnew ∪ {r};
9: Re := Re ∪ {r};
10: end if
11: end for
12: end while
Example 22 Consider again the partially-observed plant G = (X,E, δ, x0) in Fig. 2(a), where Eo = {a, c, d, g}, and
Euo = {b}. The unbounded attack structure A∞ is shown in Fig. 8.
Here, exposing states are highlighted in gray, while states in Re that are not exposing are highlighted in yellow.
To clarify how non-exposing states are added to Re according to Algorithm 3, let us consider state ({6}, {4}). Such
a state is added to Re at Step 9. Indeed, there exists a transition labeled a ∈ Eo \ Eera that yields from ({6}, {4})
to a state in Re (in such a case the exposing state is ({7}, {b∅}), and there does not exist a transition in E+ yielding
to a state not in Re. 2
Example 23 Consider the unbounded attack structure A∞ in Example 15. The 1-bounded attack automaton G1
and the 1-bounded attack structure A1 = A∞‖G1 are depicted in Figs. 10 and 11, respectively. The supremal stealthy
1-bounded attack substructure Ass1 is obtained removing from A1 all states in Re (the gray and yellow states) and
their input and output arcs. 2
Fig. 10. 1-bounded attack automaton G1.
7.1 Complexity analysis
Let us now discuss the computational complexity of computing the supremal stealthy n-bounded attack substructure
Assn .
Given a plant G with set of states X, the observer of the plant can be constructed in 2|X| steps. The unbounded
attack structure is obtained computing A∞ = Obsatt(G) ‖ Obsopr(G), thus A∞ can be constructed in 2|X| × 2|X|
steps.
Given an integer value n, the n-bounded attack structure is obtained by computing An = A∞ ‖ Gn where Gn is the
n-bounded attack automaton. Therefore, An can be constructed in 2
|X| × 2|X| × (n+ 1) steps.
Finally, the supremal stealthy n-bounded attack substructure Assn is obtained by removing from the attack structure
An all the states in Re. Therefore, the complexity of constructing A
ss
n is O(2
2|X| × n).
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Fig. 11. 1-bounded attack structure A1.
8 Stealthy attack function
In this section we introduce the key notion of stealthy attack function, to clarify how a stealthy attack substructure
can be used by the attacker to select a corrupted observation that is stealthy. The fact that the attack substructure
is supremal guarantees that all possible corrupted observations that ensure stealthyness could be actually selected.
To formalize the definition of stealthy attack function, the notion of preempting state should be preliminarily
introduced.
8.1 Preempting states
Preempting states are states from which an event in Eo should necessarily be preempted with the insertion of some
events in the observation, otherwise the resulting attack is no more stealthy.
Definition 24 The set of preempting states of an attack structure A = (R,Ea, δa, r0) is Rp = {r ∈ R∗ | ∃e ∈
Eo \ Eera : δa(r, e) ∈ Re, ∃e+ ∈ E+ : δa(r, e+) /∈ Re}. 2
In words, a state r is preempting if there exists an observable event that is not erasable and that leads from r to the
weakly exposing region Re, and there also exists at least one event in E+ that leads outside Re starting from r. By
definition, a state in Re is not a preempting state.
Example 25 Consider again the partially-observed plant G = (X,E, δ, x0) in Fig. 2(a) and its unbounded attack
structure A∞ in Fig. 8.
There is only one preempting state in A∞, namely ({6}, {5}), which is marked with a double circle in Fig. 8. Once
state ({6}, {5}) is reached, event c should be inserted (c+ in Fig. 8) to reach a state that is not in Re. 2
Note that an unbounded attack structure A∞ may contain cycles consisting of events in E+ only, and preempting
states. This corresponds to an unfeasible situation in practice. Indeed, an attacker could not insert an infinite number
of events between the occurrence of two consecutive events in the system. This well clarifies the requirement of dealing
with a bounded attack structure. An example clarifying the above remark is provided in the following where, as a
special case, the cycle is a self-loop.
Example 26 Consider the plant G = (X,E, δ, x0) shown in Fig. 12, where Eo = {a, b} and Eins = {b}. The
unbounded attack structure A∞ is shown in Fig. 13.
State ({0},{2}) is a preempting state, but there is a self-loop labeled b+ with it. This means that the attacker has
to add an infinite number of observations b before the occurrence of a to avoid entering into the exposing region. 2
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Fig. 12. Plant G.
Fig. 13. Unbounded attack structure A∞.
8.2 Stealthy attack function
The following definition formalizes the notion of stealthy attack function associated with a given attack structure.
Definition 27 Given a plant G with set of compromised events Ecom = Eins ∪ Eera, let Ass = (R,Ea, δa, r0) be a
stealthy attack substructure and Rp be the set of preempting states. A stealthy attacker can be defined by a stealthy
attack function f : P (L(G)) → E∗a , i.e., a function f to which can be associated a function χ : P (L(G)) → R such
that:
(a) ∃w ∈ {w′ ∈ E≤n+ | δ∗a(r0, w′) = r, r 6∈ Rp}
f(ε) = w ∧ χ(ε) = δ∗a(r0, w);
(b) ∀se ∈ P (L(G)), s ∈ E∗o , e ∈ Eo• if e− 6∈ A(χ(s)), then
∃w ∈ e{w′ ∈ E≤n+ | δ∗a(δa(χ(s), e), w′) = r, r 6∈ Rp},
f(se) = f(s)w ∧ χ(se) = δ∗a(χ(s), w);• if e− ∈ A(χ(s)), then
∃w ∈ e{w′ ∈ E≤n+ | δ∗a(δa(χ(s), e), w′) = r, r 6∈ Rp} ∪ e−{w′ ∈ E≤n+ | δ∗a(δa(χ(s), e), w′) = r, r 6∈ Rp},
f(se) = f(s)w ∧ χ(se) = δ∗a(χ(s), w),
where A(χ(s)) denotes the set of events enabled at χ(s). 2
In Definition 27, condition (a) means that the attacker can insert a bounded string w+ ∈ E≤n+ even if no event
occurs in the plant, provided that the state reached executing w in Ass is not in Rp, namely it is not a preempting
state. Indeed, if such a state is preempting, as explained in Subsection 8.1, the event that should be executed must
be an event in E+. In other words, a preempting state could be visited when moving in A
ss according to a certain
attack function, but it could not be the state reached after inserting all the events in E+, just before the occurrence
of a new observation.
Note that in this definition, differently from the definition of the attack function fn, we need to keep track of the
state that is reached after w. Indeed, the set of future actions depends on that. This motivates the introduction of
function χ.
Condition (b) implies that, if an event e occurs in the system, two different cases should be distinguished, namely
e− 6∈ A(χ(s)) or e− ∈ A(χ(s)). In the former case, e could not be cancelled by the attacker, who can only eventually
add a certain number of events in E+ with the constraints discussed at the previous item. In the latter case, e could
either be canceled, and again a certain number of events in E+ could be eventually added.
9 Strong or weak attacker selection
In this section we want to characterize the cases in which it is possible to select an effective (strong or weak) attacker
from a given stealthy attack substructure. We first introduce some preliminary definitions.
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Definition 28 Consider a stealthy attack substructure A = (R,Ea, δ, r0). Let Xus be the set of unsafe states. The
set of strong target states of A is Rst := {r = (ba, ba) ∈ R | (ba ⊆ Xus) ∧ (ba ∩Xus = ∅)}. 2
In words, a state is strong target if its first entry only includes unsafe states, while its second entry includes no
unsafe state. If a strong target state is reached following in A the corrupted observation, it means that the plant
enters an unsafe state but the operator does not realize it.
Definition 29 Consider a stealthy attack substructure A = (R,Ea, δ, r0). Let Xus be the set of unsafe states. The
set of weak target states of A is Rwt := {r = (ba, ba) ∈ R | (ba ∩Xus 6= ∅) ∧ (ba * Xus) ∧ (ba ∩Xus = ∅)}. 2
In words, a state is weak target if its first entry contains both unsafe and safe states, while its second entry includes
no unsafe state. If a weak target state is reached following in A the corrupted observation, it means that the plant
may either be in an unsafe or in a safe state, but the operator thinks that the system is in a safe state.
Definition 30 Let A = (R,Ea, δa, r0) be a stealthy attack substructure. We denote as A = (R,Ea, δa, r0) and call
it nonredundant stealthy attack substructure, the attack substructure where:
δa(r, e) =
{
not defined if r ∈ Rp ∧ e 6∈ E+,
δa(r, e) otherwise.
(9)
2
Therefore A = (R,Ea, δa, r0) is obtained from A = (R,Ea, δa, r0) removing those arcs that are redundant in the
sense that they are never active when defining an attack function. In particular, these are the arcs exiting from a
preempting state and labeled with an event e /∈ E+.
Proposition 31 Let A = (R,Ea, δa, r0) be a nonredundant stealthy attack substructure associated with the stealthy
attack substructure A = (R,Ea, δa, r0). It holds that:
• A strong attacker may be selected iff there exists w ∈ E∗a in A such that r = δ
∗
a(r0, w) is a strong target state.
• A weak attacker may be selected iff there exists w ∈ E∗a in A such that r = δ
∗
a(r0, w) is a weak target state.
• All possible attackers that may be selected are vain iff there does not exist w ∈ E∗a in A such that r = δ
∗
a(r0, w)
is either a strong or a weak target state. 2
Proof. By Definition 27, events e /∈ E+ are not active at preempting states when a stealthy attack function is
selected. Therefore, δa simply describes “in a structural way”, the set of possible corrupted observations. As a result,
the three items trivially follow from Definitions 28 and 29. 2
Example 32 Consider again the partially-observed plant G = (X,E, δ, x0) in Fig. 2(a), where Eo = {a, c, d, g} and
Euo = {b}. Let Xus = {5}. The supremal stealthy unbounded attack substructure Ass∞ is shown in Fig. 14.
Fig. 14. Supremal stealthy unbounded attack substructure Ass∞.
State ({5}, {6}), highlighted in green, is a strong target state. When such a state is reached following the attacked
observation, the plant is in the unsafe state {5}, while the operator thinks that the plant is in state {6}. In such a
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case, the attack is successful. In particular, the successful attack can be realized by inserting event c (c+ in Fig. 14)
when the attack substructure is in state ({5}, {5}), namely when the plant is in state {5} and the operator knows
that. 2
Example 33 Consider the plant G′ in Fig. 6(a) already discussed in Example 9 where Eo = {a, c, d, g} and Euo =
{b}. Let Eins = {c, d}, Eera = {c, g}, and Xus = {5}. The supremal stealthy unbounded attack substructure Ass∞′ is
depicted in Fig. 15.
Fig. 15. Supremal stealthy unbounded attack substructure Ass∞
′.
The light green state ({4, 5}, {6}) is a weak target state. When such a state is reached in the attack substructure,
it means that there are two states consistent with the uncorrupted observation, namely the safe state {4} and the
unsafe state {5}. However, based on the corrupted observation, the operator thinks that the plant is in state {6}.
This implies that there is some possibility that the attack is successful, but we cannot be sure of that. 2
10 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we investigate the problem of cyber attacks at the observation layer, for partially-observed discrete
event systems. In more detail, an operator observes the system evolution with a certain observation mask, which
depends on the sensors available on the system. The operator observation may be corrupted by an attacker. The
corruption may be done by erasing some events that have occurred and/or inserting some events that have not
actually occurred. It is possible to impose an upper bound on the number n of consecutive observations that can be
added by the attacker within the occurrence of two observable events in the plant.
We show how to construct a supremal stealthy attack substructure that allows the attacker to realize all the corrup-
tions on the observation that prevent the operator to understand when an unsafe state is reached. The way by which
the attacks are generated guarantees that the operator never realizes that someone is corrupting his observation,
namely the attacker remains stealthy.
As a future work, we plan to characterize and solve the same problem using Petri nets to understand if some
advantages in terms of computational complexity can be obtained and if efficient solutions can also be computed for
unbounded systems.
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